Introduction.
In response to cross-border insolvencies, conflicts of law and jurisdiction may arise and they cannot be resolved in a strictly Territorial approach. In fact, in an era of globalized and interconnected economies, an insolvency proceeding on a narrow national basis, which coexists with at least one other local proceeding may lead to unexpected outcomes. Actually, under Territorialism, each Country seizes the debtor's assets which are located within its borders and conducts a separate bankruptcy proceeding to divide those assets among local creditors according to local law, while no proceeding affects each other.
This causes a sharp fragmentation of the active and passive masses, and produces disappointing effects both on the level of creditors' recovery, and on the front of an increase of costs as well.
On the other hand, a cross-border bankruptcy resulting in only one proceeding, having worldwide jurisdiction, embracing all creditors, and including all the assets and liabilities in pool, according to a single lex concursus, is unlikely to be realized, because it requires both a general sharing of the substantive law, especially in matters of priority claim rules; and a threat to individual countries' sovereignty and a general agreement in placing the COMI as well.
From these comments, a compromise solution (so-called "modified Universalism") moves; this vision and its applications are overwhelmingly accepted among Scholars, both at the domestic level and on the international scene 1 . The result of such a widespread opinion is to be found in the main sources of hard law and soft law: the Euro- Riv. dir. comm., 2013,594. 2 Uncitral, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, "Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency", and Guide to Enactment and Interpretation. www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactment-e-pdf . 3 Nevertheless, in order to further tone down the universal approach set out in the EIR, it is not entirely excluded that only local proceedings, so-called independent territorial proceedings, may be filed for, regarding the same debtor ( art.
3, n. 4, EIR).
It should be noted that the cross-border debtor, who is likely to undergo a main and a non main proceeding at the same time, is in itself a single debtor, i.e. a debtor who is not (necessarily) part of a group of companies. In this case, in fact, the EIR provides for a coordination between local proceedings, according to a multiple enterprises approach which in turn precludes an universal settling. Therefore, a sort of procedural consolidation between parallel procedures is suggested, according to the model of the so-called "Cooperative Territoriality" 7 .
Protocols and Voluntary commitments
The EIR, while provides for a binding regulation by drawing the framework of procedural interrelationships, at the same time allows areas of contractual freedom and self-regulation. It does so on at least three times. 2, EU Reg 1346/2000). 6 It's not possible to analyse the very basic definitions for COMI of the debtor, and then of dependence, and thus of the local creditor, as well as of the local asset ( art. 2, n. 9), EIR). But it is clear that any uncertainty on these general notions is at stake in the overall stability and effectiveness of the application of the entire regulatory framework of the EIR itself. 7 That's the same solution adopted in Italian regulatory framework, according to Codice della Crisi 2019, artt. 284 ss. should be able to enter into agreements and protocols for the purpose of facilitating cross-border cooperation of multiple insolvency proceedings opening of secondary insolvency proceedings " ( Whereas 40). Actually, in order to avoid a non-main proceeding, the EIR also provides for the possibility that the court temporarily stays the opening of secondary insolvency proceedings, "when a temporary stay of individual enforcement proceedings has been granted in the main insolvency proceedings, in order to preserve the efficiency of the stay granted in the main insolvency proceedings. The court should be able to grant the temporary stay if it is satisfied that suitable measures are in place to protect the general interest of local creditors. In such a case, all creditors that could be affected by the outcome of the negotiations on a restructuring plan should be informed of the negotiations and be allowed to participate in them" ( Whereas n. 45). 
Final notations
Overall, such an effort at deregulation has to be welcome, because it serves efficiency and thus effective solutions are more likely to fit each specific case. Furthermore, it is also relevant on a systematic level, especially in the eyes of Civil Law Scholars, who witness a steady institutionalization of negotiation best practises.
It's worth noticing that the negative consequences that are intended to be avoided in this 13 Commission Implementing Regulation 12th June 2017, (EU) 2017/1105, Annex III, provides for the standard notice form to be used for the lodgement of objections in group coordination proceedings.
14 Whereas 10, EIR: "The scope of this Regulation should extend to proceedings which promote the rescue of economically viable but distressed businesses and which give a second chance to entrepreneurs. It should, in particular, extend to proceedings which provide for restructuring of a debtor at a stage where there is only a likelihood of insolvency, and to proceedings which leave the debtor fully or partially in control of its assets and affairs (...)" . way may depend on unequal regulations of domestic substantive law, especially, in terms of credit claims order, priority rules, automatic stay, and regarding disharmonies between the managing, the timing, the effects and the purposes that single local proceeding can show.
